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Feb. 25, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLIFFORD R. FRANCIS,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law- Appeal- Decisions Appealable.-An order
denying application to withdraw plea of guilty is not appealable.
[2] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-Liberality in permitting withdrawal of plea of guilty before judgment is expressly enjoined upon court by Pen. Code, § 1018.
[3] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-Withdrawal of
plea of guilty rests in sound discretion of trial court, and a
denial may not be disturbed unless court has abused its discretion.
[4] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-While it would be
better practice for court to hear evidence offered by defendant
in support of motion to withdraw plea of guilty, it is not an
abuse of discretion to deny motion without such hearing where
such evidence is in probation report before court, and where
considerable time has elapsed since entry of guilty plea.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Kurtz Kauffman, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for issuing checks without sufficient funds.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
William W. Larsen and Ray L. Smith for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Alan R.
\Voodard, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendant was charged by information in
two counts with passing two checks without sufficient funds
"·ith the intent to defraud; both checks (one in each count)
were passed on the same day, in the same place, Bennie's Clubbouse, to different employees in that place and drawn on the
same bank; one (count one) was for $60, the other (count two)
for $25. He was also charged with a prior conviction and
imprisonment for conspiracy to commit pandering.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 135; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 286 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1051; [2-4] Criminal
Law, § 212.
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Defendant with his counsel, Mr. Testa, pleaded not guilty
to both counts on his arraignment on April 25, 1952, and trial
was set for June 19, 1952. On June 3d, defendant substituted
Mr. Larsen as his attorney in place of Mr.
(What
happened to Testa does not appear.) On the
set for trial
(June 19th) defendant and his counsel r~arsen requested and
were granted a continuance to July 30th. On that date defendant and his counsel asked and were permitted to withdraw his
plea of not guilty to count one, and pleaded guilty to that
count; he admitted the prior conviction; he waived time for
sentence on that count and ~was granted leave to apply for
probation. The hearing for probation, sentencing for count
one, and disposition of count two were set for September 12,
1952. The probation officer's report, recommending denial,
was filed September 11th. On the 12th, defendant and counsel
appeared and the matters to be considered at that time were
continued at defendant's request to October 3, 1952. On that
elate at defendant's request the hearing was continued to
October lOth. On the lOth, defendant with his counsel moved
to withdraw his plea of guilty to count one. That motion and
the application for probation were denied and sentence was
pronounced. Defendant thereupon gave notice of appeal.
Thereafter defendant's motion to vacate the judgment and
for permission to withdraw the appeal was denied. After
probation was denied and judgment given, the second count
was dismissed by the court on the motion of the prosecuting
attorney in the "interest of justice."
Defendant appeals from the judgment and the denial of
his motion to \Yithdraw his plea. [1] Inasmuch as an order
denying the application to withdraw the plea of guilty by the
defendant is not appealable (People v. Shaffer, 130 Cal.App.
749 [20 P.2d
; People v. Block, 134 Cal.App. 217 [25 P.2d
242]; People v. Brickert, 3 Ca1.App.2d 474 [39 P.2d 450];
People v. Rarney, 135 Cal.App. 573 [27 P.2d 941] ; People v.
Griffin, 100 Cal.App.2d 546 [224 P.2d 47]; People v. Tidwell,
108 Ca1.App.2d 60 [238 P.2d 21] ; Pen. Code, § 1237) the
appeal therefrom is dismissed.
By way of amplification, the reporter's transcript of the
rvents on September 12. 1952, when the continuance was
gTanted. shows that drfendant 's counsel had read the
report and wanted the eontinuance beeause of some
remarks stated therein to have been made by his wife. No
snggestion of withdrawal of the guilty plea was made then or
on October 3d when a continuance was requested.
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The same transcript shows that at the hearing on October
lOth when defendant moved to withdraw his not guilty plea
the motion was made under section 1018 of the Penal Code.*
His counsel stated that it had not "occurred" to him until he
read the probation report (which would have been September
12th) and talked to defendant that the latter had given the
probation officer a "complete denial and a full defense to the
charge'' to which he had pleaded guilty. He offered to prove
that if defendant could be sworn he would testify as he stated
to the probation officer, that is, he thought he had made arrangements to cover any possible overdraft and had no intention to issue a check without sufficient funds; that he would
show mistake and inadvertence in making the guilty plea by
affidavit or oral testimony. The probation report was offered.
Counsel further stated that defendant had no intent to defraud; that the guilty plea was entered by inadvertence and
ignorance in that defendant did not know there had to be an
intent to defraud__:__that if he had made arrangements to cover
the check there would not be such intent. The district attorney opposed the motion.
The probation report shows defendant to have stated that
''in explanation'' of the charge of insufficient funds he found
it "difficult to explain." He was "reasonably certain" "the
shortage would be taken care of at that time, however, through
domestic problems I [he] failed to cover the shortage." He
had no intent to defraud. In the past, Bennie's had held
checks for a few days. He did not ask them to do so on the
instant occasion but "hoped" they would. When he presented
the checks he did not know for sure whether he had sufficient
funds but had asked his wife to deposit to his account sufficient
to cover them and thought she had done so.
The court refused defendant's offer to support his motion
and also the probation report. The report, however, had been
filed in the court and the latter must have been familiar with
its contents for it also considered at the September 12th hearing the question of probation. The basis of the refusal was
that defendant was delinquent in making his application to
change his plea; that he had full opportunity to make it some
*''On application of the dPfendant at any time before judgment the
Ponrt may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at.
the time of the plea the court must, for good cause shown, permit the
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted."
''This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and
to promote justice.'' (Pen. Code, § 1018.)
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time before it was made and he offered no justifiable excuse
for the delay.
[2] As indicated by section 1018 of the Penal Code,
supra, it must be liberally construed, that is, liberality in
permitting a withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment
is expressly enjoined upon the court. (People v. Griggs,
17 Cal.2d 621 [110 P.2d 1031]; People v. Miller, 114 Cal.
10 [45 P. 986]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522 [150 P.2d 448];
People v. Schwarz, 201 Cal. 309, 315 [257 P. 71].) [3] Also
as stated in the above cited section the withdrawal of such a
plea rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and a
denial may not be disturbed unless the trial court has abused
its discretion. (People v. Griggs, supra, 17 Cal.2d 621; cases
collected 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.), p. 599 et seq.)
[4] While it would have been better practice for the court
to have heard the evidence offered by defendant in support of
his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, the fact that this
evidence was in the probation report which was before the
court, and considerable time had expired since the entry of
the guilty plea, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
Judgment affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5460.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. REUBEN B. WEITZ,
Appellant.
[1] False Pretenses- Elements- Representation or PretensePromise.-A promise made with intent not to perform it is a
false or fraudulent representation or pretense within meaning
of Pen. Code, § 484, defining theft.
[1] See Cal.Jur., False Pretenses, § 4; Am.Jur., False Pretenses,
§ 15 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1 J False Pretenses, § 7; [2] False Pretenses, §37(1); [3] False Pretenses, §40; [4] False Pretenses,
§ 36(8); [5] Criminal Law, § 786; [6] Embezzlement, § 78; [7]
Forgery, §29(1); [8] Forgery, §7; [9] Forgery, §13; [10]
Forgery, § 31; [11] Criminal Law, § 1404( 4).

